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EXTREME DEPARTURE: NOT SO EXTREME IN THE PUBLIC
OFFERING CONTEXT
Nicolette Fata*

I.

INTRODUCTION

On October 1, 2014, Robby Shawn Stadnick and numerous others
purchased shares of Vivint Solar—a solar energy company with a lucrative
business model—helping it raise more than $300 million in proceeds.1 Any
reasonable investor would have expected his or her newly purchased shares
to, at minimum, hold their value over time, but, ideally, increase in value so
as to turn a substantial profit. This, however, was not the case for Stadnick
and others who purchased the 20,600,000 shares of Vivint Solar’s common
stock that first Wednesday in October 2014.2
Much thought surrounds the valuation of shares in anticipation of a
public offering.3 So when the price of Vivint Solar’s shares quickly dropped
by more than 22%,4 a reasonable investor, such as Stadnick, would have
justifiably been upset and concerned. In anticipation of a public offering, a
reasonable investor would presumably have read the issuer’s prospectus and
registration statement, becoming intimately familiar with the issuer’s
business model and financials, and confirming that the stock valuation was

*

J.D. Candidate, 2019, Seton Hall University School of Law; A.B., 2016, Georgetown
University. I would like to thank Professor Marina Lao for her invaluable guidance in writing
this Comment. I would also like to thank my family for their love and support in all of my
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1
Second Consolidated Amended Complaint for Violation of the Federal Securities
Laws at ¶ 1, Stadnick v. Vivint Solar, Inc., Nos. 14-cv-9283-KBF, 14-cv-9709-KBF
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2015), 2015 WL 8492757 [hereinafter Second Amended Complaint].
2
Id.
3
Shayndi Raice, The Art of the IPO, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 12, 2012, 6:54 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203922804578080763596406112 (“It’s a
fine line. Price your shares too high, and you’ll collect a lot of money. But the subsequent
drop may alienate investors and demoralize your employees. Price them too low and you’ll
grab plenty of headlines as your stock soars on takeoff, but you’ve failed to raise nearly as
much as you could have, and the initial buying frenzy may end up costing you some longterm investors.”).
4
Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1.
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reasonable and the shares were worth purchasing.5 Hence, a collective
shareholder loss of $60 million is likely to shock an investor like Stadnick.6
In the case of Vivint Solar, an investor such as Stadnick may not have
predicted such a loss based on a normal reading of the prospectus and
registration statement. This is because the loss that Stadnick and other likeinvestors suffered was the result of a conveniently timed public offering,
taking place almost immediately prior to Vivint Solar’s release of its third
quarter financial statements, which would show a dismal performance far
greater than what a number of investors would have forecasted.7 An outcome
of the sort that Stadnick and other Vivint Solar investors experienced begs
the court for intervention. Yet, for an issuing entity, it can be difficult to
predict when it is necessary to disclose interim financial statements in
anticipation of a public offering, as the circuits are split on what the
appropriate test for making that determination is: the total mix test8 or the
extreme departure test.9 This Comment will argue that the correct test courts
should apply is the extreme departure test, expressed in Shaw v. Digital
Equipment Corporation.10
Both the total mix test and the extreme departure test are fairly
straightforward and can be summarized somewhat simply. The total mix test
seeks to determine “whether there is ‘a substantial likelihood that the
disclosure of the omitted [interim financial statements] would have been
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the “total
mix” of information made available.’”11 The extreme departure test, on the
other hand, asks whether the issuing entity was “in possession of nonpublic
information indicating that the quarter in progress at the time of the public
offering will be an extreme departure from the range of results which could
be anticipated based on currently available information” in determining
whether Section 11 liability is warranted due to the omission of interim
financial statements within a prospectus, registration statement, etc.12
This Comment will examine the peculiar and significant context of a
public offering in determining whether courts considering Section 11
5
For an analysis on the reasonable investor and what is normally expected of him or
her, see Tom C.W. Lin, Reasonable Investor(s), 95 B.U. L. REV. 461 (2015).
6
Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1.
7
Id.
8
The total mix test is commonly known as the materiality test. Stadnick v. Vivint Solar,
Inc., 861 F.3d 31, 36 (2d Cir. 2017).
9
Compare id. (applying the total mix test), with Shaw v. Dig. Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d
1194 (1st Cir. 1996) (applying the extreme departure test).
10
Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1210.
11
Stadnick, 861 F.3d at 37 (quoting DeMaria v. Andersen, 318 F.3d 170, 180 (2d Cir.
2003)).
12
Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1210; 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2018).
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liability should apply the total mix test or the extreme departure test for
determining the materiality of omitting interim financial statements. Part II
of this Comment will provide the necessary background concerning Section
11 of the Securities Act of 1933.13 Part III will present an overview of
Stadnick v. Vivint Solar, Inc. and Shaw v. Digital Equipment Corporation,
and the two different materiality tests that were applied, creating a circuit
split (the “Circuit Split”). Part III will also argue that the extreme departure
test should be the applicable test for determining materiality for purposes of
Section 11 liability. Part IV will examine the policy implications underlying
both tests. Part V will argue that, moving forward, circuits should apply the
extreme departure test because it (1) best accommodates the expectations of
actual, rather than reasonable, investors; (2) best fits with the existence of
the insider trading disclose or abstain rule; and (3) best reconciles the need
for a fiduciary duty in the context of insider trading with the nonexistence of
such in a public offering. Part V will also examine the remaining issues to
be resolved in implementing the extreme departure test and concludes that
the better test for circuits to apply remains the extreme departure test.
II. INTRA-QUARTERLY DISCLOSURES, SECTION 11, AND THE SECURITIES
ACT OF 1933: WHEN IS DISCLOSURE REQUIRED?
Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933 (“‘33 Act”), which
governs the initial offering of securities, with the primary objectives of (1)
ensuring that potential investors receive significant information—financially
and otherwise relevant—regarding the securities to be sold in a public
offering; and (2) eliminating all forms of fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation
in connection with such offerings.14 To these ends, the ‘33 Act requires
issuing entities to register their securities with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), and also generally requires an issuer to disclose a
description of its properties and business, the security to be offered,
information concerning its management structure, and independently
certified financial statements.15 As such, the registration requirement seeks
to efficiently provide potential investors with a complete and accurate
impression of the security to be offered.16

13

15 U.S.C. § 77k.
The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
https://www.sec.gov/answers/about-lawsshtml.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2018) (explaining
that the ‘33 Act, “[o]ften referred to as the ‘truth in securities’ law . . . has two basic
objectives: [to] require that investors receive financial and other significant information
concerning securities being offered for public sale; and [to] prohibit deceit,
misrepresentations, and other fraud in the sale of securities”).
15
Id.
16
Id.
14
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Significantly, however, the SEC does not guarantee that the
information that issuing entities provide in their registration statements is, in
fact, accurate.17 Instead, the ‘33 Act provides investors with a private action
to enforce Section 11 for material misrepresentations and omissions in the
registration statement, among other things.18
Under Section 11 of the ‘33 Act, issuing entities have a duty to disclose
material information to potential investors in anticipation of a public
offering.19 And they may be liable for registration statements containing “an
untrue statement of a material fact or omit[ting] to state a material fact
required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not
misleading.”20 An investor who bought shares—either at the time of a public
offering, or on a secondary market and thereafter traceable to the public
offering—may bring a civil suit against the issuing entity for violating
Section 11 where that issuer omitted statements that would have been
otherwise necessary to make the registration statement complete and not
materially misleading.21
Inherent in the federal securities laws, however, is the notion that
silence on the part of an issuing entity cannot be actionable when the issuer
has no duty to disclose.22 Significant to the issue analyzed herein is the fact
that “the mere possession of material nonpublic information does not create
a duty to disclose it.”23 The context of a public offering, however, creates “a
strong affirmative duty of disclosure” on the part of the issuer,24 generating
some confusion for an issuer regarding what exactly its obligations are.
Issuing entities can turn to case law for some guidance as to the types
of information that must be disclosed.25 As previously mentioned, though,
silence where there is no duty to disclose is not actionable.26 But if an issuing
entity does choose to disclose information though it has no legal duty to do
so, the disclosure must be truthful and non-misleading.27

17

Id.
See id. See also 15 U.S.C. § 77k.
19
See generally 15 U.S.C. § 77k.
20
Id.
21
Securities
Act
of
1933,
LEGAL
INFO.
INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/securities_act_of_1933 (last visited Feb. 19, 2019)
[hereinafter LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE].
22
Shaw v. Dig. Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1202 (1st Cir. 1996).
23
Id. (citing Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 1987)).
24
Id. (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976)).
25
See J & R Mktg., SEP v. Gen. Motors Corp., 549 F.3d 384, 398 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing
15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a), 77l(a)(2) (2018)); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988);
Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 639 (6th Cir. 1993).
26
Id.
27
Id.
18
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Section 11 liability often arises out of an issuing entity’s failure to
disclose information required under Items 303 or 503 of Regulation S-K28:
Item 303 requires issuing entities to provide forward-looking projections
concerning any information that they possess;29 and Item 503 requires
issuing entities to disclose the most significant factors that potentially render
the offering risky.30
Under Item 303, an issuer must disclose any information “that
significantly or materially decreases the predictive value of [its] reported
results.”31 An issuing entity’s internal forecasts are not considered to be
material information giving rise to a duty to disclose.32 Such disclosure is
not required because of the SEC’s apprehension that investors may
misinterpret such information.33
There are certain events, courts have noted, that would require an
issuing entity to provide intra-quarter updates, however.34 “[M]aterial
forward-looking information regarding known material trends and
uncertainties [must] be disclosed as part of the required discussion of those
matters and the analysis of their effects.”35 Courts consider statements or
omissions material where a reasonable investor would have considered such
information in making a significant investment decision.36 The exact test for
materiality, as has been presented and will further be discussed in Part III,
differs amongst circuits.37 A duty to disclose, however, arises when an
28

BRENT A. OLSON, PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATIONS HANDBOOK §5:101 (2d ed. 2017).
J & R Mktg., SEP, 549 F.3d at 392 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(1), (2)(ii), (3)(ii)
(2018)).
30
City of Roseville Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. EnergySolutions, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 2d 395, 426
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c) (2018)).
31
Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1192 (11th Cir. 2002); see also
Slater v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 719 F.3d 1190, 1197–1203 (10th Cir. 2013).
32
In re Facebook, Inc. IPO Sec. & Derivative Litig., 986 F. Supp. 2d 487, 506–07
(S.D.N.Y. 2013); see also Glassman v. Computervision Corp., 90 F.3d 617, 631 (1st Cir.
1996) (“Plaintiffs’ nondisclosure claims fail because they base their allegations solely on
discrepancies between actual (but undisclosed) intra-quarterly information and [the issuing
entity’s] undisclosed internal projections.”); Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., No. 96-1077-K,
1996 WL 881659, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 24, 1996) (“[Issuing entities] have no duty to disclose
intraquarter results, even if those results are lower than the company’s internal projections.”).
33
In re Facebook, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 507 (citing In re Ivan F. Boesky Sec. Litig., 825 F.
Supp. 623, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
34
Id. at 513 (citing In re Bank of Am. Sec. Corp. Derivative & ERISA Litig., 757 F.
Supp. 2d 260, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Milman v. Box Hill Sys. Corp., 72 F. Supp. 2d 220, 231
(S.D.N.Y. 1999)).
35
Commission Guidance Regarding Management’s Discussion and Analysis of
Financial Condition and Results of Operations, Securities Act Release No. 33–8350, 68 Fed.
Reg. 75,062 (Dec. 29, 2003), https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/33-8350.htm.
36
See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232–33 (1988); Ganino v. Citizens
Util. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 161–62 (2d Cir. 2000).
37
Compare Stadnick v. Vivint Solar, Inc., 861 F.3d 31 (2d Cir. 2017), with Shaw v. Dig.
29
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issuing entity’s financial predictions based on interim financial data “cease
to be optional forecasts and instead become present knowledge.”38 Thus, the
issue that interim financial statements pose to the inquiry discussed herein
lies in the determination of whether they contain “material forward-looking
information regarding known material trends or uncertainties.”39
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
This Part provides an overview of Stadnick v. Vivint Solar, Inc. and
Shaw v. Digital Equipment Corporation, including the respective courts’
analysis of the relevant issues, including which test is to be applied in
determining whether to invoke Section 11 liability. To reiterate, the two tests
may be summarized as follows: the total mix test looks at the information
that a prospective investor had at hand in the wake of the public offering to
determine whether the quarter-end results of the issuing entity would have
been predictable by a reasonable investor given what information was made
available to them;40 and the extreme departure test looks at the information
that the issuing entity had at hand for the quarter in which the public offering
took place, and seeks to determine whether that information would have
indicated that the quarterly results would have been an extreme departure
from prior predictions.41
In light of the preceding discussion of the ‘33 Act and, particularly,
Section 11 liability, it is relevant to turn once again to the narrative that
opened this Comment. As mentioned earlier, issuing entities consider many
options in valuing their impending stock issuance,42 including the timing of
the public offering.43
Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194 (1st Cir. 1996).
38
Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Concept
Release on Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Operations,
Securities Act Release No. 6711, 52 Fed. Reg. 13715, 13717 (Apr. 24, 1987) (“Both required
disclosure regarding the future impact of presently known trends, events or uncertainties and
optional forward-looking information may involve some prediction or projection. The
distinction between the two rests with the nature of the prediction required. Required
disclosure is based on currently known trends, events, and uncertainties that are reasonably
expected to have material effects, such as: A reduction in the registrant’s product prices;
erosion in the registrant’s market share; changes in insurance coverage; or the likely nonrenewal of a material contract. In contrast, optional forward-looking disclosure involves
anticipating a future trend or event or anticipating a less predictable impact of a known event,
trend or uncertainty.”).
39
In re Facebook, Inc. IPO Sec. & Derivative Litig., 986 F. Supp. 2d 487, 508 (S.D.N.Y.
2013) (citation omitted).
40
Stadnick, 861 F.3d at 37.
41
Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1210.
42
See Raice, supra note 3.
43
For an overview of the factors and conditions that issuing entities take into account
when determining when to publicly offer shares, see Simon Benninga et al., The Timing of
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While most public offerings are strategically timed,44 the timing of
Vivint Solar’s public offering was particularly deceptive. Vivint Solar’s
public offering took place on October 1, 2014, just one day after the end of
its third quarter.45 As such, the quarter-end financial projections would have
presumably been fairly concrete and only slightly speculative.46 On
November 10, 2014, forty days after its public offering, Vivint Solar released
its financial results for the third quarter: a decrease in the company’s net loss
by $28.6 million.47 This information had not been provided to the potential
investors prior to the public offering.48 Vivint Solar’s stock thereafter lost
value; shares that had been sold at $16 per share at the public offering
dropped to $11.70 per share just forty-three days later.49
A similar situation occurred twenty-one years earlier when investors
purchased the debt and equity securities of Digital Equipment Corporation.50
In that case, Digital Equipment Corporation scheduled its public offering to
begin just eleven days before the end of its third quarter and to close four
days before the end of its third quarter.51 Just three weeks later, Digital
Equipment Corporation released its financial statements for the third quarter,
demonstrating its largest loss in over seven fiscal quarters.52 On that same
day, its common stock value fell from $28.875 to $21.125.53
While the course of events in Stadnick v. Vivint Solar, Inc. and in Shaw
v. Digital Equipment Corporation were uncannily similar, the courts in the
two jurisdictions applied different tests to determine whether the respective
quarter-to-date financial information were material, and thus their omission
from the registration statement actionable.54 The Second Circuit in Stadnick
split with the First Circuit in Shaw on the issue of whether a failure to
disclose interim financial statements may be a material omission giving rise

Initial Public Offerings, 75 J. FIN. ECON. 115 (2005) (analyzing “the optimal conditions for
taking a company public”).
44
Tom Farley, The Right Time to IPO, NYSE, https://www.nyse.com/article/right-timeto-ipo (last visited Feb. 2, 2019).
45
Stadnick, 861 F.3d at 34.
46
See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1.
47
Stadnick, 861 F.3d at 34.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 34–35.
50
Shaw v. Dig. Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194 (1st Cir. 1996).
51
Id. at 1200.
52
Id. (“[O]n April 15, 1994, [Digital Equipment Corporation] announced an operating
loss of over $183 million for the quarter that had ended on April 2, 1994. This third quarter
loss was far greater than analysts had been expecting, and the largest that the company had
reported since the first quarter of fiscal 1993.”).
53
Id.
54
Compare Stadnick, 861 F.3d 31 (applying the total mix test), with Shaw, 82 F.3d 1194
(applying the extreme departure test).
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to Section 11 liability.55
A. Shaw v. Digital Equipment Corp.
1. Factual Background
Shaw v. Digital Equipment Corporation involved an action brought by
preferred and common shareholders against Digital Equipment Corporation,
its Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chief Financial Officer (CFO), and seven
underwriting and investment banking firms.56 The plaintiffs sued the
defendants under Sections 11 and 12(2) of the ‘33 Act.57 With respect to
their Section 11 claims,58 plaintiffs asserted that Digital Equipment
Corporation’s management was aware and in possession of material facts
relating to large-scale losses to be reported in its third quarter of fiscal year
1994, which the plaintiffs argued created a duty to disclose in connection
with the public offering.59 Defendants responded by equating plaintiffs’
argument to an assertion that the issuer was required to release internal
forecasts concerning the third quarter, and argued that such a claim was
“untenable because the securities laws impose no duty upon a[n] [issuing
entity] to disclose internal projections, estimates of quarterly results, or other
forward-looking information.”60
At the time, Digital Equipment Corporation was one of the largest
computer hardware, software, and services suppliers in the world.61 Having
gone public in 1966, by the early 1990’s it was earning roughly $14 billion
per year in revenue.62 In 1992, however, Digital Equipment Corporation
suffered quarterly losses of $138.3 million in January alone and between
$30–311 million in the succeeding months.63 The company underwent a
massive overhaul of its operating and management structure, cutting 35,000
jobs and replacing its CEO,64 and, as a result, incurred restructuring charges
of approximately $3.2 billion for the years 1990–1992.65 Notably, the
company introduced a new, revolutionary product that jumpstarted its
55
B. Colby Hamilton, Second Circuit Splits with First Over Securities Disclosure Test,
N.Y.L.J. (June 21, 2017, 3:58 PM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/almID/120279
0829271/.
56
Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1201.
57
Id.
58
This factual overview and analysis of the court’s reasoning is limited to a review of
the Section 11 claim only, as that is what is pertinent to the argument made herein.
59
Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1201.
60
Id. at 1202.
61
Id. at 1199.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1199.
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financial growth in February 1992.66 It finally had a profitable quarter in
mid-1993, announcing a net profit of $113.2 million.67 This success was
unsustainable, as the company reported a loss of $72 million for the second
quarter of 1994.68
Digital Equipment Corporation thereafter filed a shelf registration with
the SEC, providing the company with the option of issuing a maximum of
$1 billion in various debt classes and equity securities.69 The company began
issuing stock on March 21, 1994, and ended its sale on March 28, 1994, four
days prior to the end of its third quarter.70 At an offering price of $25 per
share, the sale of the entirety of Digital Equipment Corporation’s depositary
shares of preferred stock resulted in $387.4 million in proceeds for the
company.71
Digital Equipment Corporation announced its third quarter earnings
less than three weeks after the close of its public offering.72 The reported
loss was far greater than analysts’ expectations and was, in fact, its largest
reported loss since fiscal year 1993’s first quarter.73 This announcement sent
preferred stock prices plummeting from the offering price of $25 per share
to $20.875 on April 15, and common stock prices plummeting from a high
of $28.875 to $21.125 by the next trading day.74
2. The Court’s Reasoning
In Shaw v. Digital Equipment Corporation, the First Circuit analyzed
whether Digital Equipment Corporation was legally obligated to disclose, in
the registration statement, the imminent report of third quarter losses to
investors.75 In sum, the First Circuit was uncertain as to the materiality of
the information that Digital Equipment Corporation had in its possession at
the time of the offering.76 Rather, it was unable to hold that Digital
Equipment Corporation “was not required to disclose material information
concerning its” third quarter interim financial statements.77 Ultimately, the
First Circuit chose to apply the extreme departure test to the abovementioned facts to determine materiality because “it [was] consistent with
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77

Id. at 1200.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1200.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1202.
Id. at 1203.
Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1203.
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the basic statutory policies favoring disclosure to require inclusion of that
information in the registration statement.”78 These statutory policies will
now be discussed.
i.

Insider Trading

In its analysis, the First Circuit began by undertaking an insider trading
analysis to compare the requirements of disclosure for an individual
corporate insider in an insider trading case to the requirements for a
corporation on the brink of a public offering.79 The court “conceptualiz[ed]
[Digital Equipment Corporation] (the corporate issuer) as an individual
insider transacting in the company’s securities, and . . . examine[d] the
disclosure obligations that would then arise.”80 The court noted that the
“disclose or abstain” rule, frequently applied to insider trading by
individuals, is also applicable to an issuing entity trading in its own
securities.81 The court expanded on this notion by positing that a rule
comparable to disclose-or-abstain should be applicable to an issuing entity
engaged in the public offering of its own shares.82 Otherwise, the court
noted, “a corporate issuer selling its own securities would be left free to
exploit its informational trading advantage, at the expense of investors, by
delaying disclosure of material nonpublic negative news until after
completion of the offering.”83
ii.

Section 11 and SEC Policy

The court then conducted a policy analysis regarding whether strong
disclosure requirements, such as those that exist in the context of an
individual corporate insider in an insider trading case, should also exist in
the context of corporate issuers.84 The civil liability imposed by Section 11
ensures that issuing entities put forth full and complete effort in preparing
their registration statements and ensuring that all required material
78

Id. at 1210.
Id. at 1203.
80
Id. The First Circuit provided several justifications for analogizing individual insider
trading and corporate insider trading. Id. For more information concerning the court’s
analysis, see LOUIS LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, SECURITIES REGULATION, ch. 9,
§ B.4 (5th ed. 2013) (“When the issuer itself wants to buy or sell its own securities, it has a
choice: desist or disclose.”); 18 DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING: REGULATION,
ENFORCEMENT & PREVENTION § 3:6 (2018) (“Issuers themselves may buy or sell their own
securities, and have long been held to an obligation of full disclosure . . . . Conceptually,
extending the insider trading prohibition to instances of issuer insider trading makes perfect
sense.”).
81
Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1203.
82
Id. at 1204.
83
Id.
84
Id.
79
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information is contained therein.85 Particular to Shaw is the fact that Digital
Equipment Corporation prepared its public offering pursuant to SEC Form
S-3, which requires that the prospectus describe:
any and all material changes in the registrant’s affairs which have
occurred since the end of the latest fiscal year for which certified
financial statements were included in the latest annual report to
security holders and which have not been described in a report on
Form 10-Q or Form 8-K filed under the Exchange Act.86
The court noted that the entire point of the requirement of disclosing material
changes under Item 11(a) is to ensure that any and all necessary updates to
the information were provided to the original SEC filings and the prospectus,
even those concerning “‘known trends and uncertainties’ with respect to ‘net
sales or revenues or income from continuing operations.’”87 Given the
amount of information and the nature of such information that Digital
Equipment Corporation had at hand during the days leading up to the end of
its third quarter,88 it would have likely realized that this information would
have indicated a financial performance departing from any predictions, or, at
least, provided the company with some uncertainty as to its financial state.
While Item 11(a) carries with it rather specific requirements, the
general scheme of the federal securities laws also provides justification for
utilizing the extreme departure test.89 The court noted that one of the primary
goals of the securities laws is to uphold the principles of fairness and
efficiency in the market.90 Coupled with the principles of fairness and
efficiency is the notion that the market must be able to correctly align a
stock’s price with its “fundamental value.”91 The court noted that the need
for such reliable, firm-specific information is particularly strong within the
context of public offerings, where prospective investors must rely solely on

85

Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2018); LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, supra note 21.
Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1205 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Instructions to Form S-3, Item
11(a)). Note that those entities filing Form S-3 prior to public offerings are of the sort not
required to file more broadly available forms, such as S-1 or S-K, and are therefore not
required to include in its prospectus the information required under Item 303: the disclosure
of “any known trends or uncertainties that have had or that the registrant reasonably expects
will have a material favorable or unfavorable impact on net sales or revenues or income from
continuing operations.” Id. at 1205 n.9 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii) (2018)).
87
Id. at 1205 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii)).
88
See id. at 1200.
89
Id. at 1207 (“Together, the Acts embrace a fundamental purpose . . . to substitute a
philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor.” (alteration in original)
(quoting Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164,
171 (1994))).
90
Id.
91
Id. at 1207–08 (citing Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of
“Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977, 988–89 (1992)).
86
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what is presented to them by the issuing entity, including stock price.92
In conclusion, the court noted that, although an issuing entity may have
fully complied with the periodic disclosure requirements of the ‘33 Act, there
remains the possibility that other, undisclosed facts may be material and,
therefore, would have mandated disclosure.93 While the court did reject the
notion that an issuing entity must disclose certain facts in every situation in
which its quarterly results may possibly be subpar and disappoint the
market,94 it held that potential investors deserve to have the most relevant
and up-to-date information available to them before making an investment
decision.95 In the case of Digital Equipment Corporation, the court
concluded that its third quarter results presented “more than a minor business
fluctuation . . . indicating some substantial likelihood that the quarter would
turn out to be an extreme departure from publicly known trends and
uncertainties.”96
B. Stadnick v. Vivint Solar, Inc.
Stadnick v. Vivint Solar, Inc. involved claims brought by stockholders
who purchased stock of Vivint Solar, Inc. during its initial public offering
(IPO), in which the plaintiffs alleged violation of Sections 11, 12(a)(2), and
15 of the ‘33 Act.97 Relying on Shaw, the plaintiffs argued that Vivint Solar
was required to disclose its interim financial statements for its third quarter,
ending one day prior to its IPO, because it reflected an extreme departure
from what was previously disclosed in the registration statement.98
1. Factual Background
Vivint Solar is a residential solar energy system company that, at the
time of its IPO, was the second largest residential solar energy installer in
the United States, possessing an 8% market share in 2013 and a 9% market
share in 2014.99 Vivint Solar, significantly, operates on a unique business
model, which is predicated on the continued ownership of the solar energy
systems that it installs.100 This business model allows Vivint Solar to benefit
from various tax credits and government incentives, which allows
“[c]ustomers [to] pay no up-front costs and instead enter into twenty-year

92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1208 (citing Kahan, supra note 91, at 1014–15).
Id. at 1210.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 1211.
Stadnick v. Vivant Solar, Inc., 861 F.3d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 2017).
Id. at 33.
Id.
Id.
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leases by which they purchase solar energy in monthly payments at
approximately 15% to 30% less than they would pay for utility-generated
electricity.”101 Thus, Vivint Solar’s monthly revenue is generated primarily
by these customer payments.102
Due to its business structure, Vivint Solar naturally incurs major upfront costs.103 Consequently, Vivint Solar has perpetually operated at a
loss.104 To account for this, Vivint Solar uses an accounting system called
Hypothetical Liquidation at Book Value (HLBV), which means that a
shareholder’s ownership in the company is valued according to the balance
sheet’s asset valuation for the company.105 Thus, the court noted that:
Due to Vivint[] [Solar’s] business model and the HLBV method,
the allocation of income (a net loss in each quarter during the
relevant period) between shareholders and [outside investors] may
vary substantially from one quarter to the next depending upon (1)
contributions by investors and (2) transfers of title to the funds that
provided the requisite capital.106
Hence, when presented with the information concerning Vivint Solar’s
business model and accounting method, a prospective investor would have
had to attempt to make sense of this complicated mix of factors to predict
the success of Vivint Solar in the event that they choose to become
stockholders. Indeed, this would have been an arduous task for any investor
that is not an institution.
In anticipation of its IPO on October 1, 2014, Vivint Solar, in
accordance with SEC regulations, issued a registration statement that
included its financial statements for the preceding six quarters.107 The
Second Circuit noted that the registration statement would have indicated
overarching fluctuating net losses, and even warned prospective investors of
the potential impact its business and accounting models could have on the
company’s income allocation amongst shareholders and outside investors.108
Despite these warnings, Vivint Solar sold 20.6 million shares of common
stock during its IPO, raising a total of $300.8 million in net proceeds.109
Stockholder turmoil, however, began forty days later when Vivint Solar
released its third quarter financial statements, indicating that outside
investor-attributable net loss decreased by $28.6 million, substantially
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109

Id.
Id.
Stadnick, 861 F.3d at 33.
Id.
Id. at 34.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Stadnick, 861 F.3d at 34.
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contributing to the decreased shareholder net income: a $40.8 million
decrease, to be exact.110 Accordingly, earnings per share fell to negative
$0.45, missing the mark of analysts’ projections by 143%.111 This naturally
caused a decrease in Vivint Solar’s stock price, which ultimately fell by
22.5% to $11.42 per share.112
2. The Court’s Reasoning
The court began by analyzing what the applicable test for determining
the materiality of omitted interim financial information should be in the
Second Circuit.113 It concluded that it should be the total mix test, based on
DeMaria v. Andersen, decided by the Second Circuit in 2003.114 The
following subsection analyzes the Second Circuit’s decision in DeMaria,
which adopted and set forth the total mix test.115
DeMaria v. Andersen concerned facts highly similar to those of Shaw
and Stadnick. In DeMaria, plaintiffs argued that the issuing entity, ILife,
failed to include in its registration statement financial information for its first
quarter, which ended at the end of March, the same month in which ILife
filed its registration statement with the SEC.116 In arriving at its conclusion,
the Second Circuit compared the situation in DeMaria to a case in which an
issuing entity’s disclosure consists of “both accurate and inaccurate
information.”117 In essence, a registration statement that does not include
interim financial information is, in fact, both accurate and inaccurate. It is
accurate in the sense that it provides all of the publicly available relevant
financial information that it was required to disclose under SEC regulations,
but, at the same time, it is inaccurate because other information exists and is
known to the issuer that would change the results of the public information
disclosed in the registration statement. The Second Circuit relied on the
Supreme Court’s guidance in cautioning that “not every mixture with the
true will neutralize the deceptive. If it would take a financial analyst to spot
the tension between the one and the other, whatever is misleading will
remain materially so, and liability should follow.”118
Following that line of reasoning, the Second Circuit chose to utilize the
test outlined by the Supreme Court in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway,

110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118

Id. at 34–35.
Id. at 35.
Id.
See id. at 36.
Id. (citing DeMaria v. Andersen, 318 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2003)).
See generally DeMaria, 318 F.3d 170.
Id. at 172.
Id. at 179.
Id. (quoting Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1097 (1991)).

FATA (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

5/20/2019 12:12 PM

COMMENT

939

Inc.—the total mix test.119 In TSC, however, the Court was not addressing
an alleged Section 11 violation.120 Rather, the Court was presented with an
alleged violation of Section 14(a) of The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(“‘34 Act”).121 As will be discussed at the end of this section, this
comparison is not particularly sound. Nonetheless, the Second Circuit
applied the total mix test in DeMaria because the Supreme Court had used
the test to determine the materiality of omitted information—although not
necessarily in the same context—in TSC.122
3. Returning to the Court’s Reasoning in Stadnick
The Second Circuit, in Stadnick applied the same—and, as will be
argued, flawed—reasoning for applying the total mix test, stating that
“DeMaria rests upon the classic materiality standard in the omission
context[] with which [the court] and most other courts are familiar.”123 In
further explaining its reasoning, the court noted that the extreme departure
test applied in Shaw was too volatile and left too many questions open—i.e.,
metrics, the role of the reasonable investor, etc.—in determining whether an
extreme departure had taken place.124 This argument will be discussed
further in Parts IV and V.
In the case of Vivint Solar, however, the Second Circuit concluded that
the company’s registration statement included ample warnings for a
prospective investor to conclude that such a result was possible.125 The court
was also not convinced that a reasonable investor would have considered the
omission material where such reasonable investor was privy to the
119

Id. at 180. See generally TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
See TSC, 426 U.S. at 441.
121
Id. The ‘34 Act concerns empowering the SEC with broad regulatory powers over the
entirety of the securities industry. The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, supra note
14. In providing so, the ‘34 Act “also empowers the SEC to require periodic reporting of
information by companies with publicly traded securities.” Id.
122
See TSC, 426 U.S. at 441, 449. It is necessary to note the analogy that the Second
Circuit found in TSC, causing it to apply the total mix test. This analogy comes, in large part,
from the language of Section 14(a) of the ‘34 Act, which states that proxy solicitations should
not be “false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or . . . omit[] to state any material
fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not false or misleading.” Id. at 443 n.6
(quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2018)). Assumedly, the Second Circuit relied on this
language in applying the total mix test to the facts in DeMaria. See DeMaria, 318 F.3d at
180.
123
Stadnick v. Vivant Solar, Inc., 861 F.3d 31, 37 (2d Cir. 2017).
124
Id.
125
Id. at 39 (“Vivint’s registration statement contained ample warnings and disclosures
that explained shareholder revenue and earning fluctuations, namely that: (1) the peculiarities
of its business model and the HLBV method render the metrics identified by Stadnick less
probative of Vivint’s performance; (2) as a result, the income available for shareholders would
likely fluctuate from quarter to quarter; and (3) Vivint anticipated its substantial operating
losses to continue.”).
120
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information concerning Vivint Solar’s peculiar business model and
accounting method.126
C. Summarizing the Split
In choosing to apply the total mix test, the Second Circuit turned to the
Supreme Court’s use of the test in the context of omissions.127 The notable
difference between the cases that DeMaria cites to in support of its adoption
of the total mix test, however, is that they are factually dissimilar to
DeMaria, and to Shaw and Stadnick.128 The cited cases involved violations
of the ‘34 Act,129 whereas DeMaria and Stadnick alleged violations of the
‘33 Act.130 The position of the plaintiffs in the ‘34 Act cases131 and the
position of the plaintiffs in the ‘33 Act cases132 are significantly different,
especially when considering the sentiments underlying corporate law theory.
The very dynamic of a publicly traded corporation underlines why
shareholders deserve the most relevant information when deciding on
whether to invest in a particular company. Unless a shareholder owns shares
in a closely-held corporation, his or her management role is slim.133
Individually, a shareholder has an even less significant role in the
corporation.134 Notably, a shareholder has no vote on matters that are
fundamental to the company’s success, i.e., deciding on whether to issue

126

Id.
See id. at 37. See generally TSC, 426 U.S. at 449; DeMaria, 318 F.3d at 178–79.
128
DeMaria cites the following cases in support of employing the total mix test: TSC, 426
U.S. 438; Press v. Quick & Reilly, Inc., 218 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2000); In re IBM Corp. Sec.
Litig., 163 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 1998). DeMaria, 318 F.3d at 180.
129
See generally TSC, 426 U.S. at 439 (“A minority stockholder in an acquired
corporation brought suit against the acquiring corporation and sellers of controlling interest
in the acquired corporation, charging violation of the ‘34 Act and rules promulgated
thereunder in regard to a joint proxy statement issued by the acquiring and acquired
corporations.”); Press, 218 F.3d at 121 (“Investors brought suits alleging that broker-dealers
defrauded them by failing to disclose receipt of fees from money market funds that firms
selected for ‘automatic sweeps’ of plaintiffs’ uninvested funds.”); In re IBM Corp. Sec. Litig.,
954 F. Supp. 81, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“Stock purchasers brought class action securities fraud
suit against corporation, alleging that corporation made false or misleading statements
regarding its ability to continue paying quarterly dividend in present amount.”).
130
DeMaria, 318 F.3d at 172; Stadnick, 861 F.3d at 35.
131
The “‘34 Act cases” refers to TSC, Press, and In re IBM.
132
The “Section 11 cases” refers to Shaw, Stadnick, and DeMaria.
133
See WILLIAM K. SJOSTROM, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: A TRANSACTIONAL
APPROACH 375–76 (2d ed. 2016) (noting that shareholders are only entitled to a vote on “(1)
election and removal of directors, (2) amendments to the corporation’s charter, (3)
shareholder (as opposed to board) initiated amendments to the corporation’s bylaws, (4)
dissolution of the corporation, (5) a merger of the corporation, and (6) a sale of all (or
substantially all) of the corporation’s assets” although the board may delegate other voting
powers to the shareholders in its charter or bylaws).
134
See id. at 378 (explaining that votes are often tied to shares and not shareholders).
127
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more stock, deciding on whether to relocate the company’s operations,
deciding on whether its CEO should be replaced, and deciding on most other
day-to-day operations of the company.135 In that regard, holding a
company’s omissions to a lower standard with respect to shareholder
disclosure claims makes sense, as it is in line with the understood, and wellestablished corporate management scheme. Holding omissions to a lower
standard in Section 11 cases where potential investors are involved is
concerning, however, because of the limited decision-making role that they
would have as actual shareholders if they did, in fact, choose to purchase
shares. Hence, deciding on whether to invest in a particular company is an
important decision that potential investors must make, as they are essentially
placing their trust in that company to make the best business decisions and
to operate in an efficient and profitable manner.
There is also informs the fundamental difference in actions arising
under the ‘33 Act and the ‘34 Act. The ‘34 Act governs after an investor has
already made the decision to invest in a company.136 The investor has
already been convinced that he or she is investing in a good company and
has already placed his or her trust in the company’s management. At this
time, after an investor has become a shareholder, fiduciary duties come into
play.137 Thus, a shareholder has recourse against director action that
potentially was not in the best interest of the company.138 These fiduciary
duties, including the duty to disclose, are not present when there is no
relationship between a company and its prospective investors.139 Thus, it is
even more important for a higher standard to be applied in the omission
context where an issuing entity is not bound by any fiduciary duties and an
investor, therefore, generally has no recourse other than through the civil
liability provisions under the ‘33 Act, i.e., Section 11.140
135

Id. at 376, 385; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2016); MODEL BUS. CORP.
ACT § 8.01(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
136
See The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, supra note 14.
137
SJOSTROM, JR., supra note 133, at 429 (“[C]orporate law imposes two broad fiduciary
duties on directors: the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.”).
138
Although most director decisions are subject to the business judgment rule, this rule
presumes that the action that potentially violated a fiduciary duty was an informed action that
was done in good faith and in the honest belief that such action was, in fact, in the best interests
of the company. Id. at 430.
139
See Chiarella v. U.S., 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (“[T]he duty to disclose arises when
one party has information ‘that the other [party] is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or
other similar relation of trust and confidence between them.’” (citation omitted)).
140
See generally Murray L. Simpson, Investors’ Civil Remedies Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 12 DEPAUL L. REV. 71 (1962). The main advantage of bringing a Section
11 claim is that “the plaintiff can sue under this section without having to prove that the
misrepresentation was addressed or intended to influence him. The cause of action runs in
favor of all innocent buyers, thus eliminating the requirement of ‘privity’ of the parties.” Id.
at 72. Additionally, there exists no “requirement of proof that the plaintiff ‘relied’ on the
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Accordingly, this Comment argues that the Second Circuit, first in
DeMaria and later in Stadnick, incorrectly ignored the unique context in
which Section 11 claims are brought as compared to the context in which the
total mix test has historically been used—that being in cases arising under
the ‘34 Act. In light of the lack of fiduciary duties present at the time of a
public offering, a higher standard for evaluating the materiality of omissions
must be used. As will be subsequently discussed, the extreme departure test
represents that higher standard.
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This Part presents the policy implications supporting the use of the
extreme departure test for omissions in the public offering context. As
discussed infra in Part III, the lack of fiduciary duties and the importance of
the public offering render it necessary to employ a higher standard in
evaluating the materiality of omissions. This must be reconciled with wellestablished law that “[a] duty to disclose ‘does not arise from the mere
possession of nonpublic market information.’”141 Thus, this Part seeks to
reconcile the lack of fiduciary duties, particularly the lack of a duty to
disclose, with the implementation of a higher materiality standard for
omissions in the context of public offerings.
A. The Insider Trader vs. The Institutional Trader
The Supreme Court, in Chiarella v. United States, endorsed the notion
of the disclose or abstain rule, which would require corporate insiders to
“disclose material facts which are known to them by virtue of their position
but which are not known to persons with whom they deal and which, if
known, would affect their investment judgment.”142 Issuing entities may be
considered insider traders, too.143 How is it, then, that an issuing entity in
registration statement.” Id.
141
Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 1987) (quoting Chiarella, 445
U.S. at 235).
142
In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961). The Supreme Court affirmed
the derivative of the disclose or abstain rule from this case. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227–30.
143
See Donna M. Nagy, The “Possession vs. Use” Debate in the Context of Securities
Trading by Traditional Insiders: Why Silence Can Never Be Golden, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1129,
1178 (1999). Insider trading liability for companies, however, concerns a company buying
or selling its own shares and repurchasing its own securities. Id. As such, it would not apply
in the context of Shaw or Stadnick. Id. at 1178 n.240; see also McCormick v. Fund Am. Cos.,
Inc., 26 F.3d 869, 876 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[An issuing entity] in possession of material nonpublic
information, must, like other insiders in the same situation, disclose that information to its
shareholders or refrain from trading with them.” (citations omitted)); Jordan v. Duff & Phelps,
Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 434–39 (7th Cir. 1987) (indicating a corporation’s duty to disclose a
merger to an employee cashing in his shares); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 638 (7th
Cir. 1963) (holding that the duty to disclose material nonpublic information “appl[ies] not
only to majority stockholders of corporations and corporate insiders, but equally to
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possession of interim financial data that may sway potential investors’
opinions of its company is not held to the same abstain or disclose rule when
it is on the brink of a public offering?
Marcel Kahan argues that the disclose or abstain rule, along with other
disclosure requirements, may promote the release of a greater quantity of
information and more reliable information.144 This would, in turn, facilitate
a more accurate assessment of stock prices that more closely relate to the
stock’s fundamental value.145 In effect, the extreme departure test is an
extension of the disclose or abstain rule—it promotes essentially the same
thing: either disclose where the need to do so is vague or abstain from issuing
shares until that information has been timely released to the public.
While imposing the disclose or abstain rule on issuing entities is
virtually impossible due to the lack of a fiduciary relationship between the
issuing entity and the prospective investor,146 the public offering market
should be a level playing field, just as the corporate repurchasing market
is.147 The extreme departure test proposes a legitimate and viable solution to
this issue. The test would not, in effect, pressure issuing entities to disclose
all, or even a large portion of the interim information—financial or
otherwise—to prospective investors. Rather, issuing entities would be
forced to disclose any interim information in their possession that would
present an extreme departure from any known trends or uncertainties. By
definition, “extreme” signifies that the information would have to be “of
[the] character or kind farthest removed from the ordinary.”148 Thus,
information that would indicate a slight stray from known trends or
uncertainties—i.e., normal business fluctuations—would not meet this
corporations themselves”); Green v. Hamilton Int’l Corp., 437 F. Supp. 723, 728 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) (“[T]here can be no doubt that the prohibition against ‘insider’ trading extends to a
corporation.”).
144
Kahan, supra note 91, at 985.
145
Id.
146
See generally Mitu Gulati, When Corporate Managers Fear a Good Thing Is Coming
to an End: The Case of Interim Nondisclosure, 46 UCLA L. REV. 675, 723 (1998) (“In sum,
although the insider-trading analogy suggests that there should be a duty to disclose material
negative information as to interim operational results, it is unclear whether such an extension
could fit within the existing structure of insider-trading law with its requirement that there be
a breach of fiduciary duty (or a similar relationship of trust and confidence). Further, to
recognize a fiduciary duty-based duty to disclose running from corporations to prospective
shareholders would, in effect, produce a duty to disclose all material information in an
offering because the nondisclosure of any material information would give rise to a claim that
the company traded on material nonpublic information. Such an expansion of the duty to
disclose would, to a considerable extent, nullify the specific offering-based disclosure
requirements of the Securities Act of 1933.”).
147
Note that the disclose or abstain rule applies to a company when it is buying or selling
its own shares or participating in securities repurchasing programs. Nagy, supra note 143.
148
Extreme, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/extreme (last visited
Feb. 2, 2019).
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standard for materiality and may be omitted without incurring liability. Only
information that is significantly beyond what would be expected would rise
to the “extreme departure” level. Thus, uncertainty regarding whether such
information would be “of [the] character or kind farthest removed from the
ordinary”149 would arise in cases where the information is either extreme or
near extreme. The disclose or abstain rule would thus be effectuated because
issuing entities could face potential Section 11 liability. Normal business
fluctuations naturally would not fall under this category of information, as
they inherently cannot be considered extreme or even approaching
extreme.150
B. Who Are Reasonable Investors, Actually?
Another important policy implication to consider is the perspective of
the reasonable investor. Both the extreme departure and the total mix tests
seek to determine whether an omission would be material to the reasonable
investor.151 Therefore, the better test would be able to account for the actual
ability of the reasonable investor to consider the information that he or she
is presented with in the prospectus and registration statement and predict the
company’s future performance. This Part is meant to address the question
posed by the Second Circuit in Stadnick regarding the implementation of the
extreme departure test: namely, what is “the precise role of the familiar
‘objectively reasonable investor’ in assessing whether a departure is
extreme.”152
In a perfect world, the total mix test would be sufficient in catering to
the needs of the reasonable investor.153 But when one looks to the reality of
who the actual investor is, it is quite evident that there exists a significant
disparity between the reasonable investor recognized by the law and the
average investor participating in today’s stock market.154 A 2012 SEC study
149

Id.
See, e.g., Shaw v. Dig. Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1211 (1st Cir. 1996) (concluding
that Digital Equipment Corporation’s third quarter results presented “more than a minor
business fluctuation . . . indicating some substantial likelihood that the quarter would turn out
to be an extreme departure from publicly known trends and uncertainties”).
151
See supra Part I.
152
Stadnick v. Vivint Solar, Inc., 861 F.3d 31, 37–38 (2d Cir. 2017).
153
See generally Lin, supra note 5, at 467 (“In terms of cognition, the reasonable investor
is generally understood to be the idealized, perfectly rational actor of neoclassical economics.
The reasonable investor is presumed to operate rationally to maximize returns in the
marketplace. Prior to making investment decisions, the reasonable investor is capable of
reading and comprehending all the noise and signals in the marketplace that encapsulate
formal disclosures, economic data, market trends, senseless speculation, and irresponsible
rumors. As such, when given the requisite information, reasonable investors are able to
properly price the risks and rewards of an investment.”).
154
See David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science
to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005, 1047 n.151 (1989) (“[E]conomists
150
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found that the average American investor did not possess basic financial
literacy and thus did not have the ability or the necessary knowledge to
safeguard him or herself from being a victim of securities fraud.155 Prime
examples of the average investor’s lack of financial literacy and ability to
safeguard against fraud are the 2008 financial crisis and the dot-com
bubble.156 With the 2008 financial crisis, there is evidence that many of the
defaulting borrowers who were issued subprime mortgages did not
understand the borrowing terms and the complex payment structures
attached to their mortgages and, in actuality, could not afford the
incrementally increasing payments.157 The case of the dot-com bubble is
even more concerning, where investors jumped at the opportunity to
purchase securities even remotely concerning the Internet and failed to
consider other, more relevant factors, such as stock valuation.158 In fact,
research has shown that there are many other factors that determine whether
a prospective investor will choose to invest in a company other than his or
her rational evaluation of that company’s ability to perform.159 Tom C.W.
Lin notes the following:
Many investors, for instance, are motivated by irrelevant factors
like sunlight, weather, and sleep when making investment
decisions. Irrational investors also chase fads and exhibit herd
mentality with their investments.
Additionally, irrational
investors frequently possess perilous amounts of optimism,
confidence, and loss aversion that diminish their capacity to make
the best investment decisions.160
Accordingly, courts should not be as confident as they are that the reasonable
investor is actually reasonable. While there is a strong legal tradition in

who assume that people are ‘rational’ decisionmakers have articulated highly sophisticated
models that purport to make predictions of great exactitude. In the real world, of course,
people are not rational decisionmakers, and the economists’ models suffer accordingly.”).
155
Lin, supra note 5, at 469 (citing OFFICE OF INV’R EDUC. & U.S. SECURITIES & EXCH.
COMMISSION, STUDY REGARDING FINANCIAL LITERACY AMONG INVESTORS 15 (2012)).
156
See id.
157
Gerald H. Lander et al., Subprime Mortgage Tremors: An International Issue, 15 INT’L
ADVANCES ECON. RES. 1, 4 (2009) (“Numerous borrowers say they didn’t understand the loan
structure and the escalating payments; in many cases, they couldn’t afford them.”).
158
Lin, supra note 5, at 469; see also David Kleinbard, The $1.7 Trillion Dot.com Lesson,
CNN MONEY (Nov. 9, 2000, 5:24 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2000/11/09/technology/overvie
w/ (“The collapse of the Internet bubble, perhaps one of the largest financial fiascoes in U.S.
history, came after a three-year period, starting in January 1997, when investors would buy
almost anything even vaguely associated with the Internet, regardless of valuation. Investors
ignored huge current losses and were willing to pay 100 times expected earnings in fiscal
2002. They were goaded by bullish reports from sell-side securities analysts and market
forecasts from IT research firms . . . .”).
159
Lin, supra note 5, at 470.
160
Id.
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utilizing the reasonable person standard, there exists risk in relying on the
reasonable investor standard in creating judicial tests in the financial context
particularly due to the market consequences that potentially may occur and,
historically, have regularly occurred.
Applying the actual reasonable investor standard to facts like those in
Shaw and Stadnick underscores the issues present in steadfastly applying the
reasonable investor standard. At the outset, it should be noted that the term
“actual reasonable investor” refers to the typical investor who, according to
Lin, lacks financial literacy, is vulnerable to trends, and often acts on impulse
or other external motivators.161 As discussed above, Shaw presented
investors with a tricky analytical situation in which predictions concerning
the company’s profitability and future success could have gone either way,162
and Stadnick, similarly, presented investors with information that was
difficult to digest and analyze.163 Although, in theory, the information was
present for prospective investors to make an accurate prediction of Vivint
Solar’s future success, an actual reasonable investor would not have been
able to easily interpret the effects of its complex accounting methods
combined with front-loaded losses. Likewise, an investor theoretically could
have predicted that Digital Equipment Corporation would, once again,
experience widespread and fluctuating losses, but this would have required
sophisticated financial knowledge and a diligent study of the company’s
past-reported financial statements. This evidences the fact that the total mix
of information available to investors would necessarily be assessed
differently depending on the investor’s level of financial sophistication. An
institutional investor would have been able to see from the total mix of
information available that there was a real risk of loss in either of these
circumstances. An individual who trades from an online brokerage account,
for example, likely would not be able to arrive at the same prediction, though,
because he or she would lack the perspective to adequately analyze the total
mix of information available to him or her.164
161
Id. at 471 (“[U]nlike the reasonable investor, who lives in a simple, perfectly efficient
world populated only with other perfectly informed, rational characters, the irrational investor
inhabits a complicated world populated with other flawed, complex characters—the real
world. Optimal investment decisions and sustained investment successes are much more
difficult to model and predict in the real world. As Isaac Newton noted after suffering large
losses during the South Sea Bubble of 1720, ‘I can calculate the motion of heavenly bodies
but not the madness of people.’” (citation omitted)).
162
Shaw v. Dig. Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1199–1200 (1st Cir. 1996).
163
Stadnick v. Vivint Solar, Inc., 861 F.3d 31, 33–35 (2d Cir. 2017).
164
See Lin, supra note 5, at 484 (“A diverse population of investors necessarily means
that investors having asymmetrical information, varying sophistication, and disparate
resources exist in the market . . . . After all, it is difficult to believe that investment banks and
hedge funds, with armies of research analysts, sophisticated forecasting models, and highspeed trading platforms, are investing on the same level as the average investor who simply
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Assessing the materiality of an omission should account for the
disparity of investors’ intelligence and sophistication along with the
resources available at their disposal. The total mix test does not recognize
this disparity.165 Because the reasonable investor standard is calibrated more
toward an institutional investor,166 this standard would basically render an
omission material only if an institutional investor would have viewed the
omitted information as altering the total mix of their forecasted conclusions
concerning the company’s performance abilities. The total mix of
information that an actual reasonable investor would garner from that same
information is lacking due to the inability of an actual reasonable investor to
fully understand, comprehend, and analyze such information.167
Accordingly, a higher standard must be utilized to account for this disparity.
The extreme departure test would be capable of doing so, ensuring that both
institutional and actual reasonable investors would have the information
necessary to form a complete picture of the health and potential success of
an issuer in more cases than would the total mix test.168
V. CONCLUSION
This Comment has argued that the extreme departure test should be the
standard for determining the materiality of an omission in the public offering
context. While the total mix test may be appropriate in determining the
materiality of other omissions or information generally, the peculiarity of the
public offering context warrants the imposition of a higher materiality
standard. Furthermore, the implementation of the extreme departure test
would result in disclosure in more cases than the total mix test, thus
establishing a quasi-disclose-or-abstain rule on issuing entities offering
shares through a public offering. It would also reduce the investing
watches CNBC, reads The Wall Street Journal, and trades with his online brokerage
account.”).
165
See generally id. at 467.
166
See generally id.
167
Lin cites multiple studies that reveal that actual reasonable investors are incapable of
“beating the market” by conducting individual research and trading. Id. at 486. Those studies
include the following: Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, Trading is Hazardous to Your
Wealth: The Common Stock Investment Performance of Individual Investors, 55 J. FIN. 773,
785–88, (2000); Nicolas P. B. Bollen & Jeffrey A. Busse, Short-Term Persistence in Mutual
Fund Performance, 18 REV. FIN. STUD. 569, 594–95 (2004); Ronald C. Lease et al., The
Individual Investor: Attributes and Attitudes, 29 J. FIN. 413, 429–31 (1974); Don A. Moore
et al., Positive Illusions and Forecasting Errors in Mutual Fund Investment Decisions, 79
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESS 95, 110–12 (1999); and Felix Salmon,
Stop Selling Bonds to Retail Investors, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 837, 837 (2004).
168
This Comment does not argue that a subjective investor test should overtake the
objective reasonable investor test. It does, however, argue that courts’ understanding of who
constitutes a reasonable investor should change to better reflect the vast majority of
investors—the actual reasonable investors. See Lin, supra note 5, at 471.
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advantage of institutional investors over individual investors—an advantage
that is attributable to the disparity in financial literacy, sophistication, and
resources between the two groups. Additionally, it would work hand-inhand with the pull of the market in attempting to ensure that stock valuation
best matches fundamental value.
Like the total mix test, the extreme departure test still safeguards the
issuing entity from the threat of overwhelming liability. The extreme
departure test would only mandate disclosure when the omitted information
would cause an extreme or near extreme departure from a known trend or
risk. Although future case law would have to refine the terms of what would
define an extreme departure, issuing entities still have clarity in their
obligations. What is clear is that events classified as extreme are those
“exceeding the ordinary, usual, or expected,”169 and, thus, events that are
more akin to the ordinary, usual, or expected would not rise to the level of
extreme. Disclosure, then, would be necessary only in cases that depart from
regular business fluctuations, yet would still be mandated more cases than
under the total mix test.170
As indicated above, however, courts would still need to determine the
metrics for determining an extreme departure.171 Metrics for determining an
extreme departure are very much dependent on the facts of each particular
case. What constitutes an extreme departure for one issuing entity may not
be an extreme departure for another issuing entity. Even in light of the factsensitive inquiry that must take place in applying the extreme departure test
and the uncertainty that this may present issuing entities, the extreme
departure test is flexible enough to maintain equity and fairness.
Not only will investors benefit from a higher materiality standard in the
context of public offerings, but so too will the market. Stock prices are often
incongruent with their fundamental value because of one or more of the
following reasons: “lack of information, misassessment of information,
speculative trading, and liquidity crunches.”172 The first three of these
reasons are implicated by the omissions of the sort in Shaw and Stadnick.
Hence, a materiality standard that induces issuing entities to disclose more
information would benefit the market by ensuring that stock prices are more
169
Extreme, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/extreme
(last visited Feb. 19, 2019).
170
The total mix test would not warrant disclosure of an extreme departure from a known
trend or risk if a reasonable investor could likely have predicted the possibility of that outcome
actually occurring. The extreme departure test would warrant disclosure even when the total
mix of information could have led the reasonable investor to predict that outcome.
171
See Stadnick v. Vivint Solar, Inc., 861 F.3d 31, 37–38 (2d Cir. 2017) (asking “which
metrics courts should look to in assessing whether such a departure has occurred” in applying
the extreme departure test).
172
Kahan, supra note 91, at 988.
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accurate.
The focus then shifts to enforcement. The ability of courts, or even the
SEC, to enforce such disclosure requirements is often doubted.173 While
courts and the SEC may undoubtedly play a role in enforcement, it is the
market itself that has the ability to force compliance with the disclosures
required under the extreme departure test.174 And, indeed, the market has a
reason to force compliance because of its inherent struggle to achieve
equality. Therefore, the extreme departure test is courts’ best attempt to
implement a disclosure obligation that complements the market’s disclosure
demands. Together, the two may interact to decrease the disparity between
an issuing entity’s stock valuation and that stock’s fundamental value.
In a society still recovering from the 2008 financial crisis, courts must
take responsibility for strengthening the statutory safeguards in place so as
to avoid the perils of the past. What the market and investors need is
transparency. What issuing entities need is a stronger market with more
investors. Adopting the extreme departure test for omissions in the context
of public offerings has the potential to benefit all parties with proper
implementation. The total mix of information points to the overwhelming
benefit of the extreme departure test.

173

See Gulati, supra note 146, at 729 (“[C]ompanies and their lawyers will no doubt ask:
(1) Does this new duty mean that when we do offerings we will have an affirmative duty to
collect our intraquarterly information and examine it to see whether or not it is material? (2)
What if we, for internal cost-related reasons, do not collect and evaluate information until the
quarter is over? (3) Does this obligation apply only to end-of-quarter offerings? (4) Are we
exempt if we time our offerings to be at the beginning of a quarter?”).
174
See id. at 690 (“Because the market itself disciplines firms, through the imposition of
nonlegal sanctions such as reputational costs, the creation of legal sanctions is largely
unnecessary to force appropriate disclosures and, in fact, is positively detrimental to a wellfunctioning market—witness the phenomenon of frivolous ‘strike suits.’”).

